Add to ORKGCredibly communicating information for agents to act upon is a challenge for central planners and managers. This paper shows that in settings where there are strategic complementarities or substitutability among agents that the accuracy of the public announcement may only be communicated by denying some agents access to the information. When agents actions are complementary, the most accurate information is rationed to signal the value of the announcement. In contrast when there is interference between agents actions, it is the least accurate information that is selectively disclosed. The rationale for this pattern of selective disclosure is best understood as a response to agentsmisuse or misinterpretation of public announcements in di¤...
I study the problem of firms that disclose verifiable information to each other publicly, in the for...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 734This paper studies how strategic interaction between ...
We study the effect of disclosure requirements in environments where experts publicly acquire privat...
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. ...
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially opti...
This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in w...
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external-ities....
This dissertation studies communication and information design in strategic settings. In each chapte...
Abstract. In the context of macroeconomic coordination, studies of the social value of information d...
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of t...
What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public information through the media and d...
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different commu...
This paper develops a Bayesian persuasion model examining a manager's incentives to gather informati...
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this ov...
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other pub- lic actors, between provid...
I study the problem of firms that disclose verifiable information to each other publicly, in the for...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 734This paper studies how strategic interaction between ...
We study the effect of disclosure requirements in environments where experts publicly acquire privat...
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive externalities. ...
In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially opti...
This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in w...
Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external-ities....
This dissertation studies communication and information design in strategic settings. In each chapte...
Abstract. In the context of macroeconomic coordination, studies of the social value of information d...
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of t...
What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public information through the media and d...
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different commu...
This paper develops a Bayesian persuasion model examining a manager's incentives to gather informati...
Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this ov...
This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other pub- lic actors, between provid...
I study the problem of firms that disclose verifiable information to each other publicly, in the for...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 734This paper studies how strategic interaction between ...
We study the effect of disclosure requirements in environments where experts publicly acquire privat...