Self-recognition in primates: Further reflections create a hall of mirrors

has provided evidence of self-recognition in apes is countered point by point. The plausibility of the defence is criticized because of poorly designed experiments, unreliable experimental effects, illegitimate cross-experimental comparisons, false inferences and anecdotal observations. A recent attempt to fortify the case using developmental data (Povinelli et al. 1993, J. camp. Psychol., 107, 347-372) was unsuccess-ful because it failed to find a reliable relationship between age and mark test performance. Consequently, there is still no convincing evidence of self-recognition or mirror-guided body inspection in animals. An alternative research strategy is recommended in which the self-recognition hypothesis is tested directly through complete, carefully designed experiments. Heyes (1994a) argued (1) that studies involving attitude towards mirror experiments ’ that my mirrors, and in particular Gallup’s mark test arguments were intended to promote (Heyes procedure (e.g. Gallup 1970) had failed to pro- 1994a, page 909). Neither this contribution from vide convincing evidence that any non-human Gallup et al., however, nor other studies cited by primates can use mirrors to derive information them and published since the paper by Heyes about their own bodies, and (2) that such a (1994a) was written (e.g. Povinelli et al. 1993) capacity, whether described as ‘self-recognition ’ have provided convincing evidence of mirror