Partially-informed Decision Makers in Games of Communication

We incorporate partially informed decision makers into games of communication through cheap talk. We analyze three different extensive-form games in which the expert and the decision maker (DM) privately observe signals about the state of the world. In game 1, the DM reveals her private signal to the expert before the expert reports to her. In game 2, the DM keeping her signal private while the expert reports to her. In game 3, the DM strategically communicates to the expert first before the expert reports to her. We find that the DM’s expected equilibrium payoff is not monotonically increasing in the informativeness of her private signal because the expert may reveal less of his information when facing a better-informed DM. Whether the DM extracts more information from the expert in game 1 or in game 2 depends on the parameters. Allowing the DM to communicate strategically to the expert first does not help her extract more information from the expert. 1