Add to ORKGWe examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac-tice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by o¤ering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyistsbudget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. JEL classi\u85cation: P16, C7
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example ...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac-tice were allowed and fr...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
In this paper, we develop a duopolistic model of legislative lobbying. Two lobbies compete to inuenc...
We consider a dynamic model of lobbying with two opposing lobbyists vying for a legislator’s support...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the extent to which political donations and contributions influe...
We develop a rationale for roll call voting and position-taking in legislatures using a formal model...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical mod...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical mod...
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example ...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example ...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this prac-tice were allowed and fr...
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma....
In this paper, we develop a duopolistic model of legislative lobbying. Two lobbies compete to inuenc...
We consider a dynamic model of lobbying with two opposing lobbyists vying for a legislator’s support...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the extent to which political donations and contributions influe...
We develop a rationale for roll call voting and position-taking in legislatures using a formal model...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical mod...
International audienceIn this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical mod...
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example ...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example ...
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to...