SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS JULY, 1978 THE INCIDENCE, NATURE, AND IMPLICATIONS OF PRICE-FIXING LITIGATION IN U.S. FOOD INDUSTRIES

Antitrust laws generally seek to promote cised or not, involves power to control the competition in U.S. markets. Alternatively, market and to set arbitrary and unreasonable these laws attempt to correct the type of prices. market failure that occurs when the market Through a series of court decisions, agree-does not sustain price competition or embodies ments among competing sellers to fix prices undesirable features, such as prices fixed and were deemed illegal per se under Section 1 of agreed upon by rival sellers. It is well known the Sherman Act. Overt price collusion thus is that the federal policy to curb price-fixing regarded as a criminal conspiracy. The crimi-agreements was central to the enactment of nalization of the price-fixing rule in effect the Sherman Act of 1890. Formal cartels of the means that the law punishes attempts to fix 19th and early 20th centuries, with their sales prices. The economic impact of the actual quotas, exclusive sales agencies, price-fixing pricing decisions of rival sellers in price-fixing committees, and customer and geographic conspiracies is of no significance in determin-sales allocations, apparently have been elim- ing guilt, even if the coconspirators maximized inated from the contemporary scene. Despite losses instead of profits. This potential discrep