I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence. This may clash with some mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as false. This account of Frege was developed by taking a long-range look at his writings over the course of his life
ABSTRACT: My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean not...
In this paper I examine a number of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frege’s concepti...
Although the details of Frege’s account of propositional attitudes are now generally taken to be in ...
Submitted to "Mind and Language" on June 24th, 2004I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the re...
I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they expr...
In this paper I offer a diagnosis of the inconsistency manifested in Frege’s writings between the id...
Frege’s exposition of the notion of thought has delivered a Platonist reading as the dominant interp...
This paper defends an interpretation of Gottlob Frege’s views on the structure of thought. I argue t...
Frege appears to hold both (a) that thoughts are internally articulated, in a way that mirrors the s...
this paper, I will discuss a well-known oscillation in Frege's conception of sense. My point is...
According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different i...
International audienceWe examine how Frege's contrast between identity judgments of the forms " a=a ...
We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare i...
We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare i...
ABSTRACT: My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean not...
In this paper I examine a number of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frege’s concepti...
Although the details of Frege’s account of propositional attitudes are now generally taken to be in ...
Submitted to "Mind and Language" on June 24th, 2004I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the re...
I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they expr...
In this paper I offer a diagnosis of the inconsistency manifested in Frege’s writings between the id...
Frege’s exposition of the notion of thought has delivered a Platonist reading as the dominant interp...
This paper defends an interpretation of Gottlob Frege’s views on the structure of thought. I argue t...
Frege appears to hold both (a) that thoughts are internally articulated, in a way that mirrors the s...
this paper, I will discuss a well-known oscillation in Frege's conception of sense. My point is...
According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different i...
International audienceWe examine how Frege's contrast between identity judgments of the forms " a=a ...
We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare i...
We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare i...
ABSTRACT: My aim is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean not...
In this paper I examine a number of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frege’s concepti...
Although the details of Frege’s account of propositional attitudes are now generally taken to be in ...