Launching and stimulating competition in telecommunications markets is an important policy goal. It contains two elements: to encourage entry and to make competition e¤ective such that consumers bene…t. The …rst one requires that entrants can make pro…ts after investing in infrastructure so that they have an incentive to invest. The second one requires prices to be su¢ciently low so that consumers enjoy higher net utilities. At a …rst glance, these two element seem di¢cult to achieve at the same time. In this paper, we consider price regulation in the retail and wholesale market and answer to what extent such regulatory policy can stimulate competition. Our main …nding is that, in the short run, asymmetric access price regulation is an e¤ec...
We consider a model with a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who faces rival operato...
The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in t...
We study in this paper whether the price charged to a competitor for the use of an essential input p...
Competition in telecommunications is being promoted throughout the world with extensive liberalisati...
This paper argues that symmetric regulation should be adopted for the increasingly competitive telec...
Many competition policy issues in regulated industries concern the structure of prices charged by mu...
Since the 1990s, local exchange telecommunications carriers (LECs) have been subject to incentive re...
We investigate how a regulatory mechanism can influence the nature of competition in a network indus...
Without access of networks to each other, competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly ...
The American telecommunications industry is in a turbulent transition, whose outcome is still far fr...
This Article explains the monopoly rationale for conventional approaches to telecommunications regul...
If regulation is supposed to replicate (some would say „mimic‟) or at least reflect the results of c...
Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bo...
I present here a unique empirical analysis of the consumer welfare benefits of prior regulation in t...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We consider a model with a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who faces rival operato...
The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in t...
We study in this paper whether the price charged to a competitor for the use of an essential input p...
Competition in telecommunications is being promoted throughout the world with extensive liberalisati...
This paper argues that symmetric regulation should be adopted for the increasingly competitive telec...
Many competition policy issues in regulated industries concern the structure of prices charged by mu...
Since the 1990s, local exchange telecommunications carriers (LECs) have been subject to incentive re...
We investigate how a regulatory mechanism can influence the nature of competition in a network indus...
Without access of networks to each other, competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly ...
The American telecommunications industry is in a turbulent transition, whose outcome is still far fr...
This Article explains the monopoly rationale for conventional approaches to telecommunications regul...
If regulation is supposed to replicate (some would say „mimic‟) or at least reflect the results of c...
Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bo...
I present here a unique empirical analysis of the consumer welfare benefits of prior regulation in t...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We consider a model with a vertically integrated monopolist network provider who faces rival operato...
The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in t...
We study in this paper whether the price charged to a competitor for the use of an essential input p...