2530). Punctuated equilibrium in French budgeting processes. Paper prepared for the workshop on ‘The comparative dynamics of problem framing: How science and power speak to each other,’ European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions

ABSTRACT We use data on French budgeting to test models of friction, incre-mentalism and punctuated equilibrium. Data include the overall state budget since 1820; ministerial budgets for seven ministries since 1868; and a more complete ministerial series covering ten ministries since 1947. Our results in every case are remarkably similar to the highly leptokurtic distributions that Jones and Baumgart-ner (2005) demonstrated in US budgeting processes. This suggests that general characteristics of administrative processes create friction, and that these general factors are more important than particular details of organizational design. The legendary centralization and administrative strength of the French state, especially when compared to the decentralized separated powers structure of the US system, where the theory was developed, is apparently not sufficient to overcome cognitive pressures causing friction. Further, our French data cover a wide range of insti-tutional procedures and constitutional regimes. The similarity of our findings across all these settings suggests that administrative structures alone are less import-ant than the cognitive reasons discussed in the original model. KEY WORDS Agenda-setting; budgeting; France; incrementalism; public policy; punctuated equilibrium