The senate electoral cycle and bicameral appropriations politics

2006. We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e. that members of a states House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolates appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of bene\u85ts to the end of senatorial terms, and, more tentatively, that the House blunts this tendency. We also \u85nd that agenda setters within a chamber bias their chambers distribution of pork barrel projects in their favor, but these biases are partly counteracted by the other chamber. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking, and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.