The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. This paper performs tests of residual asym-metric information in the French automobile insurance market for the 1995-1997 period. This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experience-rating scheme (bonus-malus). Contract choices are strongly associated with the bonus-malus of policyholders. We have access to longitudinal survey data with dynamic information both on claims and accidents. We propose a causality test to distinguish pathways through which a positive correlation arises between con-tract choice and accidents. We find evidence of moral hazard among a sub-group of policyholders with significant drivin...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a dat...
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation,...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobil...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distr...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
Empirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets has ...
International audienceA standard problem of applied contract theory is to empirically distinguish be...
This paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models, using data from the automobile insuran...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a dat...
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation,...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobil...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distr...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
Empirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets has ...
International audienceA standard problem of applied contract theory is to empirically distinguish be...
This paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models, using data from the automobile insuran...
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's...
I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a dat...
This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation,...