Add to ORKGEmpirically, managers bene\u85t from their \u85rms good fortune through their com-pensation package, and by trading their \u85rms securities. This practice could easily be eliminated by the board of directors. Theoretically, managers should not pro\u85t from changes in the \u85rms value if there is only private information in the model. Moral hazard explains the paradox of insider information and performance pay. Sharehold-ers permit managers to exploit hidden information in order to incentivize their work activities. The estimated bene\u85ts from designing contracts that depend on abnormal returns far outweigh projected savings in lower compensation from paying managers xed wages. 1 I
This article models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to...
This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for manager...
This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial comp...
This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as it pertains to m...
This paper provides evidence that managers have private information they exploit for nancial gain at...
We derive conditions under which permitting manager “insiders” to trade on personal account increase...
Corporate insiders, particularly managers, not only have access to their firms' private information,...
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensa...
We develop a pure moral hazard model, and a closely related hybrid one, where there are both hidden ...
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensa...
We develop a pure moral hazard model, and a closely related hybrid one, where there are both hidden ...
The recent accounting scandals brought into light the failure of corporate governance mechanisms to ...
This Paper presents evidence boards of directors bargain with executives about the profits they expe...
Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders ...
Firm insiders a manager and a board face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a...
This article models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to...
This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for manager...
This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial comp...
This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as it pertains to m...
This paper provides evidence that managers have private information they exploit for nancial gain at...
We derive conditions under which permitting manager “insiders” to trade on personal account increase...
Corporate insiders, particularly managers, not only have access to their firms' private information,...
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensa...
We develop a pure moral hazard model, and a closely related hybrid one, where there are both hidden ...
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensa...
We develop a pure moral hazard model, and a closely related hybrid one, where there are both hidden ...
The recent accounting scandals brought into light the failure of corporate governance mechanisms to ...
This Paper presents evidence boards of directors bargain with executives about the profits they expe...
Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders ...
Firm insiders a manager and a board face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a...
This article models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to...
This paper characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for manager...
This paper studies how private information in hedging outcomes affects the design of managerial comp...