The necessity calculus is a familiar adjuvant to the possibility calculus and an uncertain inference tool in its own right. Necessity orderings enjoy a syntactical relationship to some probability orderings similar to that displayed by possibility. In its adjuvant role, necessity may be viewed as bringing possibility closer to achieving the quasi-additive normative desideratum advocated by de Finetti. Nevertheless, there are occasions when one might choose to use possibility without the help of necessity, e.g. when the full range of alternative hypotheses is unknown, or to exploit possibility’s distinctive ability simultaneously to express preference as well as credibility ordering. Such situations arise in uncertain domains like the evalua...
A counterpart to von Neumann and Morgenstern' expected utility theory is proposed in the framew...
AbstractThe focus of this work is on the issue of managing credibility information in reasoning syst...
This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be ju...
AbstractProspects for normative consensus between probabilists and advocates of the necessity calcul...
A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the stand...
The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and decision aiding is a recurrent issue of in...
What is possible, according to the empiricist conception, is what our evidence positively allows; an...
AbstractA new technique of uncertainty management in expert systems is proposed. It is suggested tha...
This paper deals with the upper and lower bounds of a class of uncertainty measures endowed with par...
International audiencePossibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential infer...
International audienceFrom a knowledge representation point of view, it may be interesting to distin...
International audienceWe consider the problem of reasoning from logical bases equipped with a partia...
There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate i...
The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and decision aiding is a recurrent issue of in...
International audienceThis paper provides an overview of possibility theory, emphasising its histori...
A counterpart to von Neumann and Morgenstern' expected utility theory is proposed in the framew...
AbstractThe focus of this work is on the issue of managing credibility information in reasoning syst...
This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be ju...
AbstractProspects for normative consensus between probabilists and advocates of the necessity calcul...
A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the stand...
The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and decision aiding is a recurrent issue of in...
What is possible, according to the empiricist conception, is what our evidence positively allows; an...
AbstractA new technique of uncertainty management in expert systems is proposed. It is suggested tha...
This paper deals with the upper and lower bounds of a class of uncertainty measures endowed with par...
International audiencePossibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential infer...
International audienceFrom a knowledge representation point of view, it may be interesting to distin...
International audienceWe consider the problem of reasoning from logical bases equipped with a partia...
There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate i...
The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and decision aiding is a recurrent issue of in...
International audienceThis paper provides an overview of possibility theory, emphasising its histori...
A counterpart to von Neumann and Morgenstern' expected utility theory is proposed in the framew...
AbstractThe focus of this work is on the issue of managing credibility information in reasoning syst...
This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be ju...