Add to ORKGSummary: This paper uses the concepts of a minimum no-blocking frontier (MNBF) and an NTU nucleolus to establish two results on core existence: the core of a coalitional NTU game is non-empty (has a non-empty relative interior) Û the largest (second largest) excess of its nucleolus is zero (negative) Û the grand coalition’s payoff set v(N) has a point on or above (strictly above) its MNBF
Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in ...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative...
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (tran...
Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and ...
In this paper, we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characteri...
This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coaliti...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
summary:The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving ...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
A solution concept for cooperative games, the extended core, is introduced. This concept is always n...
Klauke S. NTU prenucleoli. Bielefeld (Germany): Bielefeld University; 2002.The prenucleolus for coal...
Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in ...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
We study solution concepts for NTU games, where the cooperation (or negotiation) of the players can ...
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative...
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (tran...
Let N be a finite set of players and let ρ be a class of coalitions of N. We consider games with and ...
In this paper, we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characteri...
This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coaliti...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
summary:The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving ...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
A generalization of assignment games, called partitioning games, is introduced. Given a finite set N ...
A solution concept for cooperative games, the extended core, is introduced. This concept is always n...
Klauke S. NTU prenucleoli. Bielefeld (Germany): Bielefeld University; 2002.The prenucleolus for coal...
Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in ...
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends on...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...