Add to ORKGThis paper shows that, if observed earnings are the result of employer-employee wage bargaining, under a set of specific assumptions, the standard static Mincer equation can be thought as a particular case of a dynamic wage equation. Particularly, we argue that the standard static Mincer equation is implicitly based on the hypothesis that the employee has full bargaining power, and provide (further) empirical evidence against this hypothesis
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in wage bargaining unifying for the first time the models of...
This paper shows that, if observed earnings are the result of employer-employee wage bargaining, und...
The standard human-capital model is based on the assumption that earnings instantaneously adjust to ...
The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of as...
In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal con...
In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal con...
International audienceWe derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage b...
This article argues in favour of a dynamic specification of the Mincer equation, where the past obse...
We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bar-gaining game à la H...
Abstract. This paper presents a model and some empirical findings on the wage-conflict curve. The th...
In this paper, we explore the way in which different bargaining settings affect labour market fluctu...
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a ...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, by assu...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in wage bargaining unifying for the first time the models of...
This paper shows that, if observed earnings are the result of employer-employee wage bargaining, und...
The standard human-capital model is based on the assumption that earnings instantaneously adjust to ...
The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of as...
In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal con...
In this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal con...
International audienceWe derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage b...
This article argues in favour of a dynamic specification of the Mincer equation, where the past obse...
We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bar-gaining game à la H...
Abstract. This paper presents a model and some empirical findings on the wage-conflict curve. The th...
In this paper, we explore the way in which different bargaining settings affect labour market fluctu...
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a ...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, by assu...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper aims at representing wage bargaining as an optimal control problem. Specifically, assumin...
This paper considers dynamic equilibria in wage bargaining unifying for the first time the models of...