Metaphor and discourse: How metaphor models structure domains of activity

Successful metaphors are constitutive of domains of activity (e.g., Schoen, 1979). For example, ethical debates about the implications of ‘deciphering the book of life ’ act upon, rather than question, the assumption that establishing a person’s DNA-sequence tells you as much about that person as reading a book tells you about the contents of that book. We can therefore think of successful metaphors as models for our thinking and acting. But what is it that gives some metaphors this significance? Why has the computer-metaphor of mind become constitutive of Cognitive Psychology? Why are temporal relationships spatialised in similar ways across many languages? Most recent research has aimed to answer this question by finding the ‘place ’ where metaphors ‘reside ’ – the ‘basis ’ of metaphor, so to speak. Some approaches have emphasised the social aspects of metaphorical meaning, and have argued that successful metaphors are ‘socially situated ’ (e.g., Zinken, Hellsten, & Nerlich, in press). Other (more influential) approaches have emphasised the primacy of particular (hypothesised) brain structures in accounting for the success of some metaphors. This is particularl