Add to ORKGIn an environment with dynamic arrivals of players who wish to purchase only one of multiple identical objects for which they have a private value, we analyze a sequential auction mechanism with an activity rule. If the players play undominated strategies then we are able to bound the efficiency loss compared to an optimal mechanism that maximizes the total welfare. We have no assumptions on the underlying distribution from which the players ’ arrival times and valuations for the object are drawn. Moreover we have no assumption of common prior on this distribution
This paper considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a di...
One of the most important necessary conditions for auction activities is efficiency. We consider a f...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying and selling multiple ob...
ABSTRACT: We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochas-tically to a...
We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A ...
ABSTRACT. We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infi...
This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales and sequential auctions when ...
We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, bu...
We examine the problem of selling an object to a stream of potential buyers with independent private...
ABSTRACT: We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auc-tions. New buyers...
In this note we study each bidder’s behavior in sequential sales of identical goods, where bidders t...
We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private-value auctions for diff...
Abstract. Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for buying/selling multiple objects. Existi...
Abstract: When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, ...
This paper is a mechanism design study for a monopolist selling multiple identical items to potentia...
This paper considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a di...
One of the most important necessary conditions for auction activities is efficiency. We consider a f...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying and selling multiple ob...
ABSTRACT: We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochas-tically to a...
We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A ...
ABSTRACT. We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infi...
This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales and sequential auctions when ...
We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, bu...
We examine the problem of selling an object to a stream of potential buyers with independent private...
ABSTRACT: We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auc-tions. New buyers...
In this note we study each bidder’s behavior in sequential sales of identical goods, where bidders t...
We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private-value auctions for diff...
Abstract. Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for buying/selling multiple objects. Existi...
Abstract: When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, ...
This paper is a mechanism design study for a monopolist selling multiple identical items to potentia...
This paper considers a natural dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a di...
One of the most important necessary conditions for auction activities is efficiency. We consider a f...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying and selling multiple ob...