UCSD

The twin tasks of rebuilding social and economic order in conflict and post-conflict areas will be critical for the United States and allied governments for the foreseeable future. Yet little empirical research has evaluated these efforts to see where, when, and how improving material conditions in conflict zones can enhance social and economic order. We address this lacuna by developing and testing a theory of insurgency. Following our reading of the informal literature and US military doctrine, we model insurgency as a three-way contest between rebels seeking political change through violence, a government seeking to minimize violence through some combination of service provision and hard counterinsurgency, and civilians deciding whether or not to share information about insurgents with government forces. We test the model using new data from the war in Iraq. We combine a geo-spatial indicator of violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces (SIGACTs), reconstruction spending, and community characteristics including measures of social cohesion, sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments. Our initial results support the theory’s implications—improved government service provision reduces insurgency in recent data, and the value of service provision varies predictably across communities. We suggest policy-relevant directions for future research