Add to ORKGIn many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rather who is hired. This paper offers a theory of tar-geted hiring when workers have some motivation to perform without pay for performance, and how its role changes as contracting becomes poorer
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
In many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rath...
This thesis contains three separate papers that deal with various aspects of organization theory and...
The three chapters in my thesis study employee incentive compensation. While the contracting literat...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement t...
This article examines incentive contracts under moral hazard when a principal and agents disagree ab...
International audienceLabor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate em...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
We analyze the impact of contract enforcement problems on the emergence of (involuntary) unemploymen...
This paper analyzes a large, anonymous labor market in which firms motivate their workers via re-lat...
When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
In many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rath...
This thesis contains three separate papers that deal with various aspects of organization theory and...
The three chapters in my thesis study employee incentive compensation. While the contracting literat...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement t...
This article examines incentive contracts under moral hazard when a principal and agents disagree ab...
International audienceLabor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate em...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
We analyze the impact of contract enforcement problems on the emergence of (involuntary) unemploymen...
This paper analyzes a large, anonymous labor market in which firms motivate their workers via re-lat...
When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...
This paper argues that the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitl...