Voting is the archetypical form of making a collective decision. As we have seen last week, there are a range of different voting rules, all either satisfying or violating various properties. Today we will concentrate on some of the computational questions that arise in the context of voting. For instance: • For a complex voting rule (think of the Dodgson rule), how do we actually compute the winner (; algorithms)? And what is the computational complexity of doing so? • The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem tells us that manipulation is always possible. But how hard is it, computationally, to actually find a manipulating ballot? We will concentrate on discussing a few complexity results concerning manipulation in detail, and then give a broad o...
By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, n...
Standard voting rules usually assume that the preferences of voters are provided in the form ...
Voting is the archetypical form of making a collective decision. As we have seen last week, there ar...
Abstract. When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actio...
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine to-gether the preferences of multiple agents. Agen...
In the context of voting, manipulation and control refer to attempts to influence the outcome of ele...
Research on computational social choice (for an overview, see [9]) arguably began with the seminal p...
In multiagent settings where the agents have different pref-erences, preference aggregation is a cen...
<p>For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggreg...
In many real world situations, especially involving multiagent systems and artificial intelligence, ...
In this thesis, we discuss some existing and new results relating to computational aspects of voting...
The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting ...
Computational complexity of voting manipulation is one of the most actively studied topics in the ar...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Computer Science, 2013.The thesis of this dissert...
By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, n...
Standard voting rules usually assume that the preferences of voters are provided in the form ...
Voting is the archetypical form of making a collective decision. As we have seen last week, there ar...
Abstract. When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actio...
Abstract. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine to-gether the preferences of multiple agents. Agen...
In the context of voting, manipulation and control refer to attempts to influence the outcome of ele...
Research on computational social choice (for an overview, see [9]) arguably began with the seminal p...
In multiagent settings where the agents have different pref-erences, preference aggregation is a cen...
<p>For at least two thousand years, voting has been used as one of the most effective ways to aggreg...
In many real world situations, especially involving multiagent systems and artificial intelligence, ...
In this thesis, we discuss some existing and new results relating to computational aspects of voting...
The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting ...
Computational complexity of voting manipulation is one of the most actively studied topics in the ar...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Computer Science, 2013.The thesis of this dissert...
By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is...
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, n...
Standard voting rules usually assume that the preferences of voters are provided in the form ...