In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents ’ utili-ties. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement. Moreover, natural variations of the non-cooperative game also yield ordinal payoff allocations
tricht University. This author would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Resea...
We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based ...
Orthodox game theory is often criticized for its inability to single out intuitively compelling Nash...
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preservin...
A multicoalitional bargaining problem is a non-transferable utility game and for each coalition, a b...
We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the s...
Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive c...
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative but bilateral bargaining game between agents in...
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and under asymmetric information are studied f...
Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial o...
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The...
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. Th...
Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive cooperative game to each one ...
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a ne...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
tricht University. This author would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Resea...
We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based ...
Orthodox game theory is often criticized for its inability to single out intuitively compelling Nash...
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preservin...
A multicoalitional bargaining problem is a non-transferable utility game and for each coalition, a b...
We analyze the implications of Nash’s (1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the s...
Pure bargaining problems with transferable utility are considered. By associating a quasi-additive c...
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative but bilateral bargaining game between agents in...
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and under asymmetric information are studied f...
Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial o...
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The...
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. Th...
Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive cooperative game to each one ...
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a ne...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
tricht University. This author would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Resea...
We present a generalization to the Harsanyi solution for non-transferable utility (NTU) games based ...
Orthodox game theory is often criticized for its inability to single out intuitively compelling Nash...
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