Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and the Definite Article

Abstract. Is the definite article analyzed by Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions identical to the definite article as ordinarily used in usual singular contexts? The answer proposed in the paper is “Yes”. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Russell’s theory presents a satisfactory analysis of sentences involving definite descriptions in singular. It is claimed that the theory applies on logical form of sentences, rather than on truth conditions of utterances. Further, the theory of descriptions is to be made independent from the choice of a particular universe bound variables occuring in formal transcriptions of such sentences are supposed to range over. Given this assumption, the theory cannot be blamed for wrong predictions with respect to, e.g., incomplete definite descriptions. A uniform analysis of various occurrences of definite descriptions is suggested. Russell’s Theory of Description offers a highly systematic account of the semantics of the definite article and the logical form of sentences involving definite descriptions. It prescribes, what is the kind of semantic contribution expressions of the form “the F ” make to the semantic content of sentences, and their utterances, having the form (1): (1) The F is G. The account is systematic in that it is unitarian in a sense. The account is often criticized as being too simplifying. Various kinds of examples are supposed to falsify it and different pictures are offered in its stead. However, it seems to me that critical reflections are sometimes unjustified because based on confusing Russell’s theory with considerations alien to the heart of the theory. In what follows, I suggest to divorce the theory and Russell’s treatment of the definite article from these consideration