Presidents and Personal Goals: The Speaker of the House as

Existing theories of congressional politics emphasize partisan incentives for the behavior of formal party leaders in Congress. However, these theories do not persuasively explain important cases in which Speakers of the House have sought to influence legislative outcomes contrary to the policy preferences of their party. I argue that the majority party in the House allows the Speaker to act on behalf of several expectations for leadership that are unrelated or even contrary to partisan goals, including ones related to the agenda of the institutional presidency and the Speaker’s personal preferences. As evidence for this claim, I introduce a data set of significant acts of legislative leadership by the Speaker since the 1940s, analyzing several cases from the data set. The findings suggest that our understanding of leadership in Congress may be improved by identifying the formal and informal duties and responsibilities of individual leaders and the broader contextual envi-ronment in which such leaders operate. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is a major figure in America