The Power of Suggestion: Signaling and Presidential Influence over Policy Making in the Bureaucracy

We examine the influence that presidents have over the bureaucracy at the macro level. We are interested in the president’s ability to both shape the bureaucratic agenda and induce bureaucratic policy activity. While much research has focused on more overt efforts of presidential administrations to influence the bureaucracy (Golden 2000; Wood 1988; Moe 1985), signaling models are increasingly used to tap into less overt efforts by political principals to influence bureaucratic policy making (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Carpenter 1996). Using unique data collected on presidential policy tools and substantive policy change in the federal bureaucracy, we investigate whether presidential signals, sent using certain policy tools, are able to provoke bureaucratic policy activity. Our measure of presidential efforts to signal policy directions are the policy content of State of the Union addresses. Our measure of bureaucratic policy making is the number of changes made to the parts comprising the Code of Federal Regulations. Are less overt avenues of influence such as signaling effective in inducing bureaucratic policy change? Is there a relationship between presidential signaling via State of the Union addresses and policy change i