The Role of Panels in Enhancing Legal Predictability

Abstract: This article considers the justification for using panels of judges to make decisions in common law systems. The usual argument is that panels are more likely than lone judges to make correct judgments. This article suggests an additional justification: panels increase the predictability of law, so that potential litigants can anticipate correctly which legal rules will apply in their cases. Three models, each with a different conception of the legal process and the role of precedent, are employed to demonstrate the predictability-enhancing effect of panels. This effect is strongest when precedent has a substantial impact on how judges make decisions. A prominent feature of many legal systems is the existence of courts — particularly at the appellate level — in which panels of judges make decisions. The justification for using a panel of judges rather than a lone judge seems obvious: a panel is more likely than a single judge to make a correct decision, where “correct ” is understood to mean the dominant opinion in the legal community. This is true because the majority opinion of a group of judges is more likely than the opinion of a single judge to match the majority opinion of the large