The Choice of Institutions for Trade Disputes

In trade policy, the parallel process of creating regional trade associations, participating in the multilateral trade system, and concluding bilateral arrangements has resulted in overlapping jurisdictions. This forms an example of a “regime complex ” as defined by Raustiala and Victor (2004, 279): “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a partic-ular issue-area. ” Each institutional forum has different features regarding the level of legalization and the number of issues and actors. Yet many trade issues could conceivably come up in any of these negotiation fora. Indeed, the ability to choose among competing jurisdictions and use exit as a form of leverage represents a common feature in this style of governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Lobby groups and governments on both sides of a trade negotiation try to choose the set of rules that will favor their preferred outcome. The selection process within the trade regime complex filters the most difficult trade disputes into WTO trade rounds or dispute adjudication, while easier trade problems are resolved in bi-lateral and regional venues. Export industries push their governments to address foreign trade barriers. Yet WTO rules that restrict use of coercive tactics outside of the WTO reduce the cost for respondent governments to stand firm against concessions at the bilateral level. This make