Add to ORKGIn many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rather who is hired. This paper offers a theory of tar-geted hiring when workers have some motivation to perform without pay for performance, and how its role changes as contracting becomes poorer. ∗Preliminary Draft. University of Chicago, GSB
When changing jobs is costly, efficient employment arrangements are characterized by complex contract...
Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of various in...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...
In many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rath...
The three chapters in my thesis study employee incentive compensation. While the contracting literat...
This thesis contains three separate papers that deal with various aspects of organization theory and...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
We analyze the impact of contract enforcement problems on the emergence of (involuntary) unemploymen...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
This paper analyzes a large, anonymous labor market in which firms motivate their workers via re-lat...
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement t...
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to...
This article examines incentive contracts under moral hazard when a principal and agents disagree ab...
The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - t...
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its in-cumbent worker who possesses firm-spe...
When changing jobs is costly, efficient employment arrangements are characterized by complex contract...
Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of various in...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...
In many organizations, the way that incentive problems are alleviated is not via contracts, but rath...
The three chapters in my thesis study employee incentive compensation. While the contracting literat...
This thesis contains three separate papers that deal with various aspects of organization theory and...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
We analyze the impact of contract enforcement problems on the emergence of (involuntary) unemploymen...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
This paper analyzes a large, anonymous labor market in which firms motivate their workers via re-lat...
There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement t...
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to...
This article examines incentive contracts under moral hazard when a principal and agents disagree ab...
The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - t...
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its in-cumbent worker who possesses firm-spe...
When changing jobs is costly, efficient employment arrangements are characterized by complex contract...
Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of various in...
Using a real-effort task laboratory experiment, we investigate how the menu of available contracts a...