©2007 The Aristotelian Societ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci IX—HOW DOES COHERENCE MATTER?

Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements ’ and, es-pecially, to what I call ‘ such’. These requirements ly coherent: for example, Nevertheless, these requir why we should satisfy the there are no requirements struct a theory of error fo In recent work, particula to say that we are ‘ration are coherently related w case. The intuitive idea is tain normative tension, o another, and this tension the attitudes is revised.1 have attracted perhaps t quirements of formal co these is: Non-Contradiction believes p, then at t There are also said to be to avoid beliefs that are have beliefs that are clos grees of belief that satisf 1 See, for example, Broome (1999 2 Although I believe that rational I formulate N as a ‘state ’ requirem requirement governing diachroni little difference.y ety, Vol. CVII, Part 3 229 rational requirements of formal coherence as are satisfied just when our attitudes are formal-when our beliefs do not contradict each other. ements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear m. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that of formal coherence. I do so by trying to con-r the idea that there are such requirements. rly in value theory, it has become common ally required ’ to see to it that our attitudes ith one another, whatever else may be the that incoherent attitudes give rise to a cer-r exert a kind of rational pressure on each, or pressure, is relieved just when one of The putative rational requirements that he most attention are what I will call ‘re-herence as such’. Perhaps the simplest of (N): One is rationally required (if at t one one does not believe not-p).2 requirements of formal coherence as such logically inconsistent more generally, to ed under logical consequence, to have de-y the axioms of probability, to intend the; 2005), Wallace (2001), and Scanlon (2007). requirements are best understood as process requirements, ent governing synchronic states, rather than as a ‘process’ c transitions between them. For present purposes, it make