Add to ORKGWe have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of the properties we may wish a social preference structure to have relate to social welfare. This concept can be used, for instance, to assess the quality of an allocation of resources to agents. Today will be an introduction to this area: • Reminder: ordinal and cardinal preferences of individual agents • Introduction to the fairness-efficiency dilemma • Social welfare orderings and collective utility function
We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members’ ordinal preferences – that is,...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
Arrow’s celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individ-uals ’ preferences into a social or...
This version: November 2000 (First Version: January 2000)Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the a...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
We introduce the concept of a universal social ordering, de\u85ned on the set of pairs of an allocat...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
International audienceIn a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which dep...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
This paper studies individual social welfare preferences when facing a trade-off between equality an...
We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members’ ordinal preferences – that is,...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
Arrow’s celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individ-uals ’ preferences into a social or...
This version: November 2000 (First Version: January 2000)Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the a...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
We introduce the concept of a universal social ordering, de\u85ned on the set of pairs of an allocat...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
International audienceIn a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which dep...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
This paper studies individual social welfare preferences when facing a trade-off between equality an...
We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate members’ ordinal preferences – that is,...
By taking sets of utility functions as a primitive description of agents, we define an ordering over ...
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...