Stage Effects in the Cartesian Theater: A review of Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained

1.1 `We're all zombies. Nobody is conscious ' (Dennett 1991, p. 406) is an assertion Dennett is actually brought to make in his attempt to maximally provoke his readers; his title serves a similarly provocative role.<1> 1.2 Judging by such expressions, Dennett undoubtedly would like his work to be even more provocative than it actually turns out to be. The main thrust of Consciousness Explained is to apply a widely accepted thesis about the relation between mind and brain---non-homuncular functionalism---in a program of philosophical therapy to rub away a variety of puzzles raised by both philosophers and experimentalists about consciousness. I believe that the central thesis will be relatively uncontentious for most cognitive scientists, but that its use as a cleaning solvent for messy puzzles will be viewed less happily in most quarters. I will start by briefly presenting Dennett's views on functionalism and method and then present some concerns about Dennett's sanitation projects. 1.3 Functionalism is the theory that evolved out of mind-brain identity theory, the thesis that mental states or processes are just identical to some particular brain states or processes. That theory, introduced by J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place in the 1950s, suffer