By

I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens ’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens ’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens ’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts