to fill high job positions

This paper analyzes the recruitment strategies of firms aiming to fill high job positions. For that, we consider three recruitment channels actually used to hire managers: employee referrals, private employment agency and internal promotion. This last channel leads to consider also the recruitment of lower job positions (ex-ecutives) mediated through traditional channels or through the TNU channel. The model highlights the connection between executives hired through TNU who hold particular strong network and managers who will be hired through the employee Referrals channel. The efficiency of this channel is then made dependant to the size of the TNU network in the labor market. When several firms are considered in a stationary equilibrium setting, the combination of channels generates multiple rational expectation equilibria. If firms are homogeneous, the optimal choices of firms can involve coordination failures. If they are heterogeneous by their size and technologies, conflicts of interest can also emerge among firms and between firms and Grandes Ecoles