A system of n asexual populations is considered where both intra- and interspecific frequency-dependent game conflicts with lack of information take place. The concept of a strict n-species ESS is introduced which implies local asymptotic stability of the replicator dynamics of pure phenotypes. The dynamical concept of strict stability is also introduced which turns out to be equivalent to the strict n-species ESS concept. The above notions are also related to similar concepts considered in the literature for the same biological situation. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved
In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s conce...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the...
Abstract The notion of a strict equilibrium set is introduced as a natural extension of the notion o...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pro...
Abstract. Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of ...
As is well known, equilibrium analysis of evolutionary partnership games can be done by studying a s...
Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of mutations ...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
Ever since Maynard-Smith and Price first introduced the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (...
We extend the ideas of evolutionary dynamics and stability to a very broad class of biological and o...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
AbstractWe define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist together through ...
In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s conce...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the...
Abstract The notion of a strict equilibrium set is introduced as a natural extension of the notion o...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We pro...
Abstract. Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of ...
As is well known, equilibrium analysis of evolutionary partnership games can be done by studying a s...
Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of mutations ...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
Ever since Maynard-Smith and Price first introduced the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (...
We extend the ideas of evolutionary dynamics and stability to a very broad class of biological and o...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
AbstractWe define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist together through ...
In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s conce...
International audienceThis paper proposes an extension to a family of evolutionary game dynamics cal...
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the...