Thoughts as Data, Thoughts as Code: Natural Goodness and a Model of the Will∗

In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot presents a conception of human moral goodness that places it on a continuum with other sorts of goodness of other sorts of living beings. She holds that human moral difference is no different in kind from the goodness of ants or oak trees, it is simply the good-ness of a faculty unique to the human mind: the rational will. In this paper, I adopt Foot’s position regarding species-specific goodness. My main project will be to suggest a computational model of the human will that could underpin Foot’s conception of human goodness. The most important part of my model of the will is a distinction between mental content that is read and mental content that is executed. I conclude with some further speculative thoughts about consciousness that this (partial) model of the human mind suggests. 1 Natural Goodness Foot’s central thesis is that there is a natural or autonomous goodness that is specific to each species1. Anything that a creature does will either be in accord with the natural goodness of its species or not in accord with that goodness. This goodness is related to not just an individual, but to the general life cycle or natural history of the individual seen as a member of some species. Foot begins discussing this idea of natural goodness by discussing attributes that philosopher