Add to ORKGInsurance markets are proving to be a fruitful area for empirical work on contract theory. Since much of the theoretical work on contracts is motivated by moral hazard and adverse selection, insurance seems a natural product on which to study the impact that private information and unobservable actions have on contract terms and performance. Whil
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
textabstractThe theory of insurance law and economics holds that the insured will display les...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
Insurance markets are proving to be a fruitful area for empirical work on contract theory. Since muc...
In the last decade or so, numerous papers have been devoted to empirical investigations based on con...
International audienceA standard problem of applied contract theory is to empirically distinguish be...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
International audienceSeveral recent papers on empirical contract theory and insurance test for a po...
This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobil...
We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing...
Willardsen presented on his upcoming article with the same title. The abstract from this paper is a...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and ...
In this paper, we work with a repeated insurancemodel, and examine the influ-ence of experience-rati...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
textabstractThe theory of insurance law and economics holds that the insured will display les...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
Insurance markets are proving to be a fruitful area for empirical work on contract theory. Since muc...
In the last decade or so, numerous papers have been devoted to empirical investigations based on con...
International audienceA standard problem of applied contract theory is to empirically distinguish be...
This paper exhibits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
International audienceSeveral recent papers on empirical contract theory and insurance test for a po...
This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobil...
We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing...
Willardsen presented on his upcoming article with the same title. The abstract from this paper is a...
The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the econom...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...
This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and ...
In this paper, we work with a repeated insurancemodel, and examine the influ-ence of experience-rati...
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potentially important features of car insurance markets. Inte...
textabstractThe theory of insurance law and economics holds that the insured will display les...
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazar...