A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotiation both before and after it is played. We ask (1) what kind of environments admit the renegotiation-proof implementation of some social choice rules? (2) for a given environ-ment, what kind of social choice rule are implementable in a way that is renegotiation-proof? and (3) for a given renegotiation-proof implementable social choice rule, how can the rule be implemented in a way that is indeed renegotiation-proof? We obtain, for environments with private values, a tight characterization of renegotiation-proof mech-anisms: for complete information environments, this characterization is in terms of ex-post efficient decision rules; for incomplete information env...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and ca...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information,...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable efficient outcome functions is greatly reduce...
We characterize decision rules which are implementable in mechanism design settings when, after the ...
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of comp...
This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among ...
The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanism whose equilibrium ou...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete in-formation i...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and ca...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
A mechanism is said to be renegotiation-proof if it is robust against renegotation both before and a...
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information,...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable outcome functions is reduced if the mechanism...
According to standard theory, the set of implementable efficient outcome functions is greatly reduce...
We characterize decision rules which are implementable in mechanism design settings when, after the ...
This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of comp...
This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among ...
The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanism whose equilibrium ou...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete in-formation i...
In situations in which the social planner has to make several decisions over time, before agents hav...
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t -peri...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and ca...