The present model of individual decision-making is based on a bounded-rationality style assumption. The de-cision-maker's preferences over actions lead to choice probabilities that can be defined as the reflect of his be-havior when facing past cases of the same choice prob-lem, i.e. his choice memory. Actually, the actions utility is supposed to be cumulatively learnt, case after case. Satisfying a weak assumption of cognitive rationality, the decision-maker searches for relevant choices that in-crease the probability for the chosen action to be the best. Then, our main result establishes that he should design biased cases which are the only ones leading to relevant choices. Furthermore, we show that the bias introduced in the case mu...
People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive p...
International audienceThis paper suggests that decision-making under uncertainty is, at least partly...
Preferential choices are often products of stochastic accumulation of noisy preferences in favor of ...
Gilboa and Schmeidler provide a new paradigm for modeling decision making under uncertainty. Case-ba...
A virtue of good theory is that it is general; theories that predict a wide range of events have obv...
Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. D...
ABSTRACT. Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
At the core of the many debates throughout cognitive science concerning how decisions are made are t...
Purpose This chapter reviews models of decision-making and choice under conditions of certainty. It ...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e.g....
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
Although the principle of bounded rationality seems more realistic for formulating formal models of ...
It seems inconsistent to model boundedly rational action choice by assuming that the agent chooses t...
People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive p...
International audienceThis paper suggests that decision-making under uncertainty is, at least partly...
Preferential choices are often products of stochastic accumulation of noisy preferences in favor of ...
Gilboa and Schmeidler provide a new paradigm for modeling decision making under uncertainty. Case-ba...
A virtue of good theory is that it is general; theories that predict a wide range of events have obv...
Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. D...
ABSTRACT. Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
At the core of the many debates throughout cognitive science concerning how decisions are made are t...
Purpose This chapter reviews models of decision-making and choice under conditions of certainty. It ...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e.g....
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and alternative psychological theories (e.g....
Although the principle of bounded rationality seems more realistic for formulating formal models of ...
It seems inconsistent to model boundedly rational action choice by assuming that the agent chooses t...
People often face preferential decisions under risk. To further our understanding of the cognitive p...
International audienceThis paper suggests that decision-making under uncertainty is, at least partly...
Preferential choices are often products of stochastic accumulation of noisy preferences in favor of ...