Add to ORKGWe extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilities that arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many pub-lic goods, voluntary contribution equilibrium typically generates, not only too low a level of public good provision, but also the wrong mix of public goods. We also analyse the neutrality property in the more gen-eral setting, and extend a neutrality proposition of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)
Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single private good and linear produ...
The T. C. Bergstrom, L. E. Blume, and H. R. Varian (1986) model of voluntary contributions to public...
When individuals provide noncooperatively many public goods, not only are contribution levels genera...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
There is a lengthy economic tradition studying “public goods. ” Despite the pluralistic title, much ...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to a pure...
We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to inter...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Can the government get people to contribute more to public goods by subsidizing voluntary contributi...
This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public...
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of ...
Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single private good and linear produ...
The T. C. Bergstrom, L. E. Blume, and H. R. Varian (1986) model of voluntary contributions to public...
When individuals provide noncooperatively many public goods, not only are contribution levels genera...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
There is a lengthy economic tradition studying “public goods. ” Despite the pluralistic title, much ...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to a pure...
We consider a two-stage voluntary provision model where individuals in a family contribute to inter...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Can the government get people to contribute more to public goods by subsidizing voluntary contributi...
This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public...
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of ...
Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single private good and linear produ...
The T. C. Bergstrom, L. E. Blume, and H. R. Varian (1986) model of voluntary contributions to public...
When individuals provide noncooperatively many public goods, not only are contribution levels genera...