Add to ORKGThis paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our model, they still choose to set wage sequentially. The equilibrium locations are not influenced by the timing of wage setting
I analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce...
This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is ...
In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper an...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can dela...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the equilibrium production-location decisions of a Cournot–Nash duop...
The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation ...
In the Hotelling framework, the equilibrium first-degree discriminatory prices are all lower than th...
We provide a comparison of the location equilibria in a duopoly model under three alternative soluti...
We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning...
This paper extends the analysis of duopoly market by distinguishing two types of competition: (i) th...
The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized m...
In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determination settin...
We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a duopoly under price competition with a unionized ...
We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning...
I analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce...
This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is ...
In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper an...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can dela...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the equilibrium production-location decisions of a Cournot–Nash duop...
The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation ...
In the Hotelling framework, the equilibrium first-degree discriminatory prices are all lower than th...
We provide a comparison of the location equilibria in a duopoly model under three alternative soluti...
We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning...
This paper extends the analysis of duopoly market by distinguishing two types of competition: (i) th...
The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized m...
In a unionized duopoly with price setting firms market shares in different wage determination settin...
We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a duopoly under price competition with a unionized ...
We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning...
I analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce...
This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is ...
In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper an...