Add to ORKGAfter an innovation has been developd and patented, there are both social and individual incentives for firms to license the existing technology. With licensing agreement, the industry can avoid the ’wasting ’ investment on the technology which is already existing. The incumbent can design and negoti
We consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside inn...
We consider a model for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside in...
We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under sever...
In the context of a Cournot duopoly, this paper studies the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation ...
In technology-based industries, incumbent firm often license their technology to potential com-petit...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
To relax the assumption that licensees have no bargaining power, which is prevalent in the licensing...
A bargaining licensing game is developed to study how the patent holder's bargaining power affects h...
Technology license markets play important roles as the intermediaries which connect technology licen...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-re...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
We examine how investment possibilities by licensees and nonlicensees affect the two-part licensing ...
The article develops a model to assess the optimal licensing contract in the presence of competition...
Technology innovations continue to be one of the greatest drivers of economic growth. Realizing the ...
We consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside inn...
We consider a model for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside in...
We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under sever...
In the context of a Cournot duopoly, this paper studies the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation ...
In technology-based industries, incumbent firm often license their technology to potential com-petit...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
To relax the assumption that licensees have no bargaining power, which is prevalent in the licensing...
A bargaining licensing game is developed to study how the patent holder's bargaining power affects h...
Technology license markets play important roles as the intermediaries which connect technology licen...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-re...
Obtaining a patent provides the patentee with the ability to offer a potential entrant a license to ...
We examine how investment possibilities by licensees and nonlicensees affect the two-part licensing ...
The article develops a model to assess the optimal licensing contract in the presence of competition...
Technology innovations continue to be one of the greatest drivers of economic growth. Realizing the ...
We consider amodel for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside inn...
We consider a model for licensing a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside in...
We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under sever...