Running Head: THE AGENTIC SELF The Agentic Self: On the Nature and Origins of Personal Agency Across the Lifespan

In this chapter, we examine personality development using the human agency concept as an overarching theme. We first articulate fundamental assumptions about agency, with a quick sketch of its organismic meta-theoretical roots. Secondly, we explore the philosophical and historical underpinnings of agency as a central concept in both past and present psychological theories. We then examine the various layers of agency and discuss their development antecedents and consequences. Finally, building upon the rich historical literature and recent theorizing, we conclude with some comments and suggestions on future directions. Fundamental Assumptions of Agency Both current and past theories of agency share the meta-theoretical view that organismic aspirations drive human behaviors. This organismic perspective presumes that humans are the “authors ” and active contributors to their behavior and development. Most human behavior is seen as volitional and described in terms of self-regulated, goal-directed actions, where actions are defined as self-initiated and purposive activities (Boesch, 1991; Brandtstädter, 1998; Chapman, 1984; Ryan, 1993). Because of this inherent propensity toward activity and self-regulation, we speak of the individual in terms of personal agency or as an agentic self. The concept of personal agency does not reinvent constructs such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-concept, and so on. Rather, it helps to organize such concepts into the multi-layered model of the self that is premised on volitional goal-directed actions (see Figure 1). Key characteristics of actions include: a) Actions are motivated by both biological and psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2002