Add to ORKGWe would like to thank xxx for helpful comments and Nuffield College for its hospitality. The most basic problem in bargaining is what happens when two players with perfect information about each other must both agree on how to split a surplus or else the surplus vanishes. The ideal model of this situation would: 1. Give plausible results (e.g., a 50-50 split between symmetric players
I examine the pure-strategy solutions of the sealed-bid bargaining game with incomplete information,...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
We study Myerson’s incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of veri-fiable ty...
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible ou...
Ariel Rubinstein proved a perfect equilibrium partition exists in a bargaining model. His results co...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and a...
Consider the betting problem where two individuals negotiate to determine the amount each will bet. ...
International audienceWe propose a new non-cooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargainin...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
We propose a mechanism for resolving bargaining problems.<br />The mechanism allows two players to m...
We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargai...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
I examine the pure-strategy solutions of the sealed-bid bargaining game with incomplete information,...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
We study Myerson’s incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of veri-fiable ty...
Most of the economic literature on bargaining has focused on situations where the set of possible ou...
Ariel Rubinstein proved a perfect equilibrium partition exists in a bargaining model. His results co...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and a...
Consider the betting problem where two individuals negotiate to determine the amount each will bet. ...
International audienceWe propose a new non-cooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargainin...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
We propose a mechanism for resolving bargaining problems.<br />The mechanism allows two players to m...
We investigate the empirical content of the Nash solution to two-player bargaining games. The bargai...
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to b...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
I examine the pure-strategy solutions of the sealed-bid bargaining game with incomplete information,...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
We study Myerson’s incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of veri-fiable ty...