Studying Terrorism with Experimental Games

This project consists of a series of laboratory experiments motivated by theoretical and policy issues related to terrorism. This study will test insights gained from game-theoretical modeling, and casual observation in controlled laboratory settings. Brief Description- Experimental methods are a useful tool for the study of behavior in strategic situations or games, where each agent’s payoff depends on decisions made by other strategic participants, whose behavior must be anticipated. While experimental games have been used in many economic contexts, their use in terrorism is very recent (see Hess, Holt, and Smith, 2007). Meanwhile game theorists and risk analysts have developed some interesting results and predictions about attacker-defender interactions motivated by terrorism and international conflict. In addition, testable insights about these interactions can be gleamed from tabletop, war-gaming, and simulation exercises. This project will explore the use of experimental games to test some of these emerging theories and predictions. Objectives- The objective of this project is to test hypotheses about the behavior of actors (defenders, attackers) in selected terrorism contexts, using experimental games. Interfaces to other Center Projects- This work will be closely linked to the game theoreti