It has been argued that the attribution of intentional actions is sensitive to our moral judgment. I suggest an alternative, where the attribution of intentional actions depends on modal (and not moral) considerations. We judge a foreseen side-effect of an agent’s intentionally performed action to be intentional if the following modal claim is true: if she had not ignored considerations about the foreseen side-effect, her action might have been different (other things being equal). I go through the most important examples of the asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality and point out that the modal account can cover all the problematic cases, whereas the moral account can’t. I. Morality and the attribution of intentional actions It has...
In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a giv...
Abstract: People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that su...
What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has g...
Do moral appraisals shape judgments of intentionality? A traditional view is that individuals first ...
Butler's and Knobe's cases appear to show that our attributions of intentional actions are sensitive...
Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggest...
Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentio...
Many philosophers have argued that alternative possibilities are required for an agent’s moral respo...
The present study contributes to the discussion on the different components which constitute the int...
Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical in...
It is often argued that Utilitarianism is impractical because our actions have extremely complex and...
In a series of recent papers both Joshua Knobe (2003a; 2003b; 2004) and I (2004a; 2004b; forthcoming...
International audienceBased on the “Knobe Effect,” Knobe has argued that moral evaluations can influ...
Recent studies concerning folk concept of intentional action reveal interesting asymmetry: people ha...
In moral dilemmas performing an action often leads to both a good primary and a bad secondary effect...
In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a giv...
Abstract: People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that su...
What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has g...
Do moral appraisals shape judgments of intentionality? A traditional view is that individuals first ...
Butler's and Knobe's cases appear to show that our attributions of intentional actions are sensitive...
Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggest...
Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentio...
Many philosophers have argued that alternative possibilities are required for an agent’s moral respo...
The present study contributes to the discussion on the different components which constitute the int...
Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical in...
It is often argued that Utilitarianism is impractical because our actions have extremely complex and...
In a series of recent papers both Joshua Knobe (2003a; 2003b; 2004) and I (2004a; 2004b; forthcoming...
International audienceBased on the “Knobe Effect,” Knobe has argued that moral evaluations can influ...
Recent studies concerning folk concept of intentional action reveal interesting asymmetry: people ha...
In moral dilemmas performing an action often leads to both a good primary and a bad secondary effect...
In two experiments, observers received information about a stimulus person and then attributed a giv...
Abstract: People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that su...
What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has g...