One Europe, One Vote? The political economy of European Union

hoped that a single Europe would speak with more authority – and more influence – in the international arena. This was certainly true in the 1950s and 1960s, as a reconstructed Europe attempted to affect international politics in a world of super-powers to which it was subordinate. It has been given added urgency, in the minds of many, with the rise of a post-Cold War world dominated by a single superpower, the United States. Whether to temper or to counter American demands, recent European experience has heightened the view that one Europe would be more influential if it had one foreign policy voice. The same calculation has been applied to other areas of Europe’s international relations, including in the economic realm. A common European representation in the International Monetary Fund/World Bank system would have more votes than the United States – and thus a veto. At the Bank for International Settlements, the Group of 8, the World Trade Organization, and other international economic institutions, there is a widespread view that a pooled European presence would increase Europe’s influence. This is particularly clear in international monetary affairs, where there already is a common European institution, the European Central Bank, that is the natural representative of the euro zone at least.1 But a common European international representation is more complicated than may appear at first glance. A collective European voice requires a collectively agreed upon policy and bargaining position, which means that it requires compromise among EU members. In this sense, adopting a common 1 See, on this, McNamara and Meunier 2002