Peter van Onselen: Bicameralism and Representation

Major party affiliated Upper House representatives in the Australian Parliament face two forms of representative expectations: Party and factors that are ancillary to party (often competing). The party and competing expectations on major party Senators are evolving with the increased professionalisation of political operations in Australia. Partisanship in the Senate is not necessarily driven primarily by loyalty or ideological orientation. Rather, it is a result of organisational dependence amongst major party Senators at the State level. This organisational dependence is highly factionalised however, and can thereby represent a competing expectation to that of the professional party as defined by Panebianco (1988). Partisanship is ensured through pre-selections and the ensuing electoral process (van Onselen 2004). This paper details how partisanship impacts on representation in the Australian party political environment. Given the party backgrounds of Senators, the party's selection methods, and the electoral system's party bias in the Upper House, it is not surprising that major party Senators have a series of party expectations they are expected to comply with. These expectations can conflict with the traditional representative functions of MPs to the parliament and the electorate. This paper examines and classifies major party expectations of Senators, presenting a classification model for assessing their activities. This model assists with an understanding of the functionary (home state) and institutional (Parliament and Canberra) roles of Senators