Comparative study of successful French and Anglo-Saxon shareholder activism. Unpublished working paper

This article presents a legal, theoretical and empirical study to understand distinctive features of successful French shareholder activism. We compare its evolution with Anglo-Saxon shareholder activism across the period January 1989 to June 2008. Over the period studied, 203 French corporations were criticized by dissident shareholders. To measure the success of French activism, we examine to what extent activist shareholders are successful in achieving their objectives. We find significant differences according to sponsor identity, the degree of influential activity and the time period. Our results show that, throughout the period studied, there is a correlation between successful outcomes and the most aggressive influential degree (law suit) with an absence of private engagement. But since 2001, when there was a legal enforcement to protect minority shareholders and institutional changes in order to develop popular ownership, we observe a new tendency in the French activism process. Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon common law countries, the role played by investor associations is a significant factor in successful French activism. However, in accordance with a global phenomenon, activist hedge funds and proxy professionals are increasingly critical of bad corporate governance. The consequence is that French activism is becoming more intensely professionalized and concerted