The Perceptual Nature of Mental Models

In the rst comprehensive formulation of the theory of mental models, Johnson-Laird proposes several constraints on any psychological theory of reasoning. He argues that his theory fullls these constraints due to two properties of mental models: structure preservation and naturalness. However, during the elaboration of his theory over the last decades, especially the central property of naturalness was not paid much attention to. It hence has to be questioned if the theory in its present form still possesses the explanatory power originally claimed. In this chapter, I will outline an interpretation of structure preservation and naturalness within a philosophical framework. This leads to the claim that mental models are structures partially isomorphic to what they represent and that they contain exclusively perceptual relations. I will close with some proposals for rening the theory of mental models, such that the originally proposed constraints can be met (again). Only this rened version can stand as a true alternative to theories of mental logics. 1 I am a member of the research project \Self-consciousness and Concept Formation in Humans " lead by Prof. Albert Newen, sponsored by the VokswagenStiftung. This wor