When an auction is followed by an opportunity for resale, bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. These valuations vary with the resale market structure, can differ across auction types, and may be lower or higher than if resale were impossible. Although resale introduces a common value element to the model, revenue equivalence can hold; when it fails, this is due not to affiliation but to differences in information conveyed to the secondary market. Information linkages between markets can also lead to signaling and, in some cases, preclude separation in the auction
This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We add speculators--...
In this paper we study in a series of experiments how the possibility of resale alters the common re...
This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face \u85nancial constraints that may force them to resel...
We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. Wi...
We study \u85rst- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. ...
In this paper we study the role of resale opportunities in secondary markets over the bidding proces...
We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders ’ private information ar...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
We study \u85rst-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent pri-vate values. Asymmetries...
A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong...
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries le...
Abstract If agents engage in resale, it changes bidding in the initial auction. Resale offers extra ...
We examine the problem of selling an object to a stream of potential buyers with independent private...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We add speculators--...
In this paper we study in a series of experiments how the possibility of resale alters the common re...
This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face \u85nancial constraints that may force them to resel...
We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. Wi...
We study \u85rst- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. ...
In this paper we study the role of resale opportunities in secondary markets over the bidding proces...
We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders ’ private information ar...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
We study \u85rst-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent pri-vate values. Asymmetries...
A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong...
We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries le...
Abstract If agents engage in resale, it changes bidding in the initial auction. Resale offers extra ...
We examine the problem of selling an object to a stream of potential buyers with independent private...
We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) \u85 rst-price auction m...
This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We add speculators--...
In this paper we study in a series of experiments how the possibility of resale alters the common re...
This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face \u85nancial constraints that may force them to resel...