By enlarging the parameter space originally considered by Singh and Vives (1984) to allow for a wider range of cost asymmetry, Zanchettin (2006) finds that the Singh and Vives result that firms always make larger profits under quantity competition than under price competition fails to hold. This paper shows that while profit ranking between price and quantity competition can be (partially) reversed the celebrated result by Singh and Vives that firms always choose a quantity contract in a two-stage game continues to hold in the enlarged parameter space
A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneou...
We analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that for ...
Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics sp...
This paper explores the impact increased competition may have on the distinction between demand and ...
International audienceThis paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a prod...
and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic i...
This paper draws upon Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), to develop a model of asymmetric competition bet...
An n-firm mixed oligopoly is examined with product differentiation, in which quantityadjusting and p...
The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then ch...
We inspect the interlink between the endogenous choice of price- and quantity- setting behavior in a...
We build a simple model of quantity competition to analyze the effect of switching costs on equili...
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related ma...
Asymmetries arise and persist provided that one firm has a strategic advantage over the other. The t...
Bilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides...
In this paper, we show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially dep...
A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneou...
We analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that for ...
Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics sp...
This paper explores the impact increased competition may have on the distinction between demand and ...
International audienceThis paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a prod...
and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic i...
This paper draws upon Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), to develop a model of asymmetric competition bet...
An n-firm mixed oligopoly is examined with product differentiation, in which quantityadjusting and p...
The authors analyze a duopoly model where firms first choose locations on a line segment and then ch...
We inspect the interlink between the endogenous choice of price- and quantity- setting behavior in a...
We build a simple model of quantity competition to analyze the effect of switching costs on equili...
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related ma...
Asymmetries arise and persist provided that one firm has a strategic advantage over the other. The t...
Bilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides...
In this paper, we show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially dep...
A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneou...
We analyze the competitive effects of quantity discounts in an asymmetric duopoly. We find that for ...
Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics sp...