The ethnicity distraction: Political credibility, clientelism and partisan preferences in Africa

Abstract: This note concludes that political competition in Africa is shaped by the inability of political parties to make commitments that are credible to large fractions of the electorate, rather than by broad appeals to the interests of co-ethnics. Political competition does not meet the conditions for ethnicity to be the cause of policy failure, slow growth, and civil war, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, as is argued in a large literature. The absence of political credibility can yield these same outcomes, however. This paper examines these conflicting positions using data on the partisan preferences of 21,000 individuals from 16 African countries. In 14 of the 16 countries, the evidence rejects the argument that competing political parties mobilize support with credible commitments to serve the aggregate interests of larger ethnic groups. In contrast, gift-giving and approval of incumbent performance are generally significant determinants of partisan preferences, consistent with the assumption that political competitors are constrained in their ability to make broadly credible promises. Disclaimer: The opinions and findings here are those of the author and do not represent the views of the World Bank or its directors. The ethnicity distraction: Political credibility, clientelism an